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INTRODUCTION   
 
In March 2015, the Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the 
national data protection authority of France, fined Google €100,000. What was the 
crime?  
According to the CNIL, the tech giant had failed to respect hundreds of French 
citizens’ requests to delist links that referenced their personal information . To justify its 
claim, the CNIL cited a decision by the European Court of Justice made earlier in the 
year that established an online “right to be forgotten” in Europe.1 Under this right to be 
forgotten, individuals may request that search engines delist links that reference their 
personal information from search results. Search engines need not grant these requests, 
but they are now obligated to review them.2  
Initially, Google complied with the European court’s decision. In June 2015, the 
company posted an online form for European users wishing to request the delisting of 
links.3 Google then proposed a compromise: if it accepts a request for delisting, it only 
                                                     
1 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 
Judgement of the Court (High Chamber), European Court of Justice, May 13 2014, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mod
e=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=811635. 
2 Europe proposed the right to be forgotten as a solution to what privacy scholars have termed the 
“problem” of digital eternity.’ The problem of digital eternity arises from the Internet’s near -infinite 
capacity to store personal data, as well as from its ability to render that data more widely and rapidly 
accessible. Michael Douglas, "Questioning the Right to Be Forgotten." Alternative Law Journal 40, no. 2 
(2015): 109.  
3 “EU Privacy Removal: Request removal of content indexed on Google Search based on data protection law 
in Europe,” Google, accessed March 6, 2017, https://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/legal-removal-
request?complaint_type=rtbf&visit_id=1-636277126973122480-1018813509&hl=en&rd=1&pli=1.   
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delists the offending result from the European extensions of the search. Thus, the 
offending result still shows up for those using the U.S. version of Google search. 
Google’s compromise irked France’s national data protection authority. The CNIL 
immediately ordered Google to apply the delisting globally, across all of its domain 
names; in other words, it demanded a “global right to be forgotten.” But Google fought 
back, arguing in an informal appeal to CNIL President Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin that 
“[w]hile the right to be forgotten may now be the law in Europe, it is not the law 
globally.”4  
Falque-Pierottin did not waver. She countered in a statement:  
Contrary to what Google has stated, this decision does not show any 
willingness on the part of the CNIL to apply French law extraterritorially. 
It simply requests full observance of European legislation by non-
European players offering their services in Europe.5 
 
These terse exchanges between Google and the CNIL highlight the potency of France’s 
engagement with the debate on the right to be forgotten. While the European Court of 
Justice ruling that established the right to be forgotten certainly ignited a debate among 
Western privacy scholars and policymakers hailing from both sides of the Atlantic, no 
country has participated in the debate with as much fervor as has France. While a few 
scholars note this particularity in passing, none sufficiently explain its origins. This thesis 
aims to fill that gap. What explains France’s unique sense of urgency with regards to the 
digital right to be forgotten? 
                                                     
4 “Implementing a European, Not Global, Right to Be Forgotten,” Google Europe Blog, last modified July 30, 
2015, https://europe.googleblog.com/2015/07/implementing-european-not-global-right.html.  
5 Ibid.   
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My answer to this question has two parts. The first part dismantles a myth 
circulating in the academic literature. The myth incorrectly posits that French privacy 
jurisprudence sufficiently explains France’s uniquely ardent support for the right to be 
forgotten. The second part of my answer offers a more comprehensive explanation for 
France’s ardent support of the right to be forgotten and for its energetic engagement with 
cybergovernance policy more broadly. My explanation takes into account extralegal 
factors—cultural as well as political—that scholars have thus far ignored.  
ROADMAP  
 
I divide this thesis into three core chapters: 
Chapter One provides a detailed analysis of French privacy jurisprudence as it 
relates to the digital right to be forgotten. This analysis reveals that French courts have 
not unequivocally supported either the digital right to be forgotten or its supposed real-
space antecedent, le droit à l’oubli. On the contrary, the case law on both the right to be 
forgotten and le droit à l’oubli is fractured. This finding challenges the notion that origins 
of the digital right to be forgotten can be identified in French law, and thereby suggests 
that French privacy jurisprudence does not sufficiently explain France’s attitude and 
actions in the right to be forgotten debate. This review of French case law demonstrates 
that there is no coherent legal “right to be forgotten,” either in real-space or in 
cyberspace. Therefore, legal tradition on the right to be forgotten does not explain 
France’s fervent support for the right. 
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Chapter Two traces the evolution and impact of the long-established societal 
"mentalités" with regard to honor and reputation. In particular, I focus on the 
responsibility of the French state to shield individuals from excessive public scrutiny. I 
present two case studies, the first on the 18th century royal administrative practice of the 
lettre de cachet de famille, and the second on the 1819 legislative debates on the Serre 
laws—a series of laws regarding defamation. These case studies illustrate the value that 
French citizens place on the protection of honor and reputation, often ceding individual 
liberties in exchange for state protection of personal information. These attitudes help 
explain, in part, France’s support for the right to be forgotten.  
Chapter Three focuses on France's enduring resistance of U.S. digital hegemony 
and its aim to demonstrate French exceptionalism in the cybersphere. I examine the 
evolution of French cyberpolicy through the theorization and implementation of two 
cyber paradigms: le télématique and le modèle républicain. I show that while French 
cyberpolicy has changed significantly over the course of recent decades, its core 
objectives remain stable and transparent: first, a rejection of American digital hegemony, 
and second, a demonstration of French exceptionalism in the cybersphere. France’s 
attitude toward the right to be forgotten represents a continuation of these twin 
objectives within France’s current cyber paradigm.  
I will conclude my analysis with a synthesis of my argument and suggestions for 
further research.   
BACKGROUND 
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In 1998, a Spanish newspaper, La Vanguardia, published an auction notice in its print 
edition announcing the forced sale of two private properties. The notice was published 
on behalf of the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, with the purpose of 
attracting as many bidders as possible. It mentioned one of the sellers, Mario Costeja 
González, by name and also mentioned that González was forced to sell the property to 
pay off his social security debts. A couple of years later, the newspaper made the notice 
available online in its digital archive.6 
In 2010, twelve years after the original publication of the notice, Costeja González 
lodged a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) against the 
newspaper, Google Spain, and Google Inc. Costeja González claimed that the listing of 
the article infringed on his privacy rights. González had resolved his insolvency debts 
many years prior and thus claimed that a reference to the debts and his identifying 
information was irrelevant and damaging to his reputation. The Spanish court did not 
make a decision on the case. Instead, it referred the case to the European Court of 
Justice. The case involved three central questions:  
1. Does the EU’s 1995 Data Protection Directive apply to search engines, such as 
Google? 
2. Does the EU Directive apply to Google Spain, given that Google’s data processing 
server is in the United States?  
3. Does an individual have the right to request that his or her personal data be 
removed from a search engine (the ‘right to be forgotten’)?7  
 
                                                     
6 Edición Del Lunes, 19 Enero 1998, Lavanguardia, accessed July 14, 2016, 23, 
http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1998/01/19/pagina-23/33842001/pdf.html.  
7 “Factsheet on the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling,” Ec.europa.eu, 1, accessed July 15, 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf. 
 6 
The ECJ did not order Google to deindex the search result linking to the auction notice. 
Rather,  it ruled that search engines such as Google constitute "controllers" of personal 
data and thus are not exempt from complying with the EU data protection rules 
outlined in the 1995 Data Protection Directive, regarding the removal of information 
deemed "inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive" for data processing.  
In doing so, the court established a digital right to be forgotten. The court 
clarified, however, that this right to be forgotten is not absolute. It is the responsibility 
of the data controller to conduct a case-by-case assessment to determine whether the 
listing in question is “‘inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive’ for the purposes of data 
processing.”8  
France has embraced the right to be forgotten with significantly more zeal than 
its European counterparts. A Google Transparency Report reveals that, since the 2014 
ECJ decision, France has reigned supreme in total right–to-be-forgotten removal 
requests. As of July 1, 2016, Google had received 95,768 delisting requests from France, a 
total of 321,028 URLS.9 The French not only submitted the most requests to be 
forgotten—they were also disproportionately successful in obtaining request approvals.  
According to the Transparency Report, Google removes 49.1% of France’s requested 
URLS.10 It is clear, however, that France is unsatisfied with its relative domestic success. 
At this time, France is the only country that explicitly pressures Google to implement 
                                                     
8 Ibid. 
9 “European Privacy Requests for Search Removals,” Google Transparency Report, accessed July 1, 2016, 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/.  
10 Ibid.  
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the broadest possible interpretation of the right to be forgotten: a global delisting of the 
requested URLs.    
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
Taking note of France’s unique zeal for the digital right to be forgotten, some scholars 
have isolated French privacy jurisprudence as ground zero for the right. These scholars 
claim to have identified the origin of the digital right to be forgotten in an archaic 
French legal concept called le droit à l’oubli. Rosen (2012), for example, explicitly makes 
this claim:  
In Europe, the intellectual roots of the right to be forgotten can be found 
in French law, which recognizes le droit à l’oubli—or the “right of 
oblivion”—a right that allows a convicted criminal who has served his time 
and been rehabilitated to object to the publication of the facts of his 
conviction and incarceration.11 
 
Here, Rosen draws a direct link from the French “right of oblivion” (or le droit à 
l’oubli) to the current right to be forgotten. He does so in an effort to highlight 
what he deems a sharp contrast between European and American approaches to 
the problem of digital eternity.12 Rosen claims that Europeans have a strong 
intellectual and legal tradition of protecting personal histories through laws 
analogous to the French droit à l’oubli. Americans, in contrast, limit individuals’ 
                                                     
11 Jeffery Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten,” Stanford Law Review Online, Symposium Issue (2012): 88,  
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-88.pdf. While Rosen is the 
most prominent scholar to have made this claim in a scholarly article, it has been echoed in several law firm 
newsletters and publications. See “Remembering the Right to Be Forgotten,” News & Insights, Wiley Rein 
LLP, 2014, http://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-5013.html; and “The Right to be 
Forgotten,” Griffin Law UK, May 2014, http://www.griffinlaw.co.uk/right-forgotten/.  
12 Rosen, “The Right to Be Forgotten.” 
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ability to escape their personal histories by way of the First Amendment, which 
protects the publication of criminal history.13    
But some scholars dispute these claims. Lindsay (2014), for example, argues that 
the droit à l’oubli is doubtful under French jurisprudence:  
Although some have claimed that the right to oblivion is derived from 
French jurisprudence, this is also a less than accurate analysis. According 
to Markesinis et al.  the droit à l’oubli is doubtful under French law, with 
the Cour de Cassation apparently rejecting the right, although 
commentary and some lower courts do apparently support a form of the 
right.14 
 
Furthermore, both Terwangne (2012) and Lindsay (2013) argue that the archaic 
droit à l’oubli and the new right to be forgotten are related, but conceptually 
distinct, terms. The former refers to the right to be unburdened by one’s criminal 
past, currently afforded in some jurisdictions both within and outside Europe.15 
The latter refers to a right to the removal of online personal data, or to the 
deindexation of that data from digital archives and search engines. 
Here we see a disagreement in the academic literature. Some scholars 
identify the archaic droit à l’oubli as the historical antecedent of the digital right to 
                                                     
13 Ibid. 
14 David Lindsay, “The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in European Data Protection Law, in Normann Witzleb et al., 
Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law: Comparative Perspectives, (Cambridge University Press, 2014): 305. 
15 Gregory W. Voss and Céline Castets-Renard, "Proposal for an International Taxonomy on the Various 
Forms of the 'Right to Be Forgotten': A Study on the Convergence of Norms," Journal on 
Telecommunications and High Technology Law 14 (2016): 300. Access to judicial rehabilitation procedures 
is not unique to France. In the UK, the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act of 1974 allows the state to ignore 
certain less serious convictions after the passage of a fixed period of time following the completion of the 
sentence, provided that the offender has committed no other offenses since serving his sentence. In the 
United States, this type of “right to be forgotten” exists at the state level. Connecticut state law, for 
example, allows the erasure of criminal records under certain conditions, one of which is the passage of 
time. The express purpose of this law is to allow those with criminal records to be “rehabilitated” in the 
public sphere. In addition, most states have some form of “erasure law” aimed at clearing the records of 
arrestees whose cases have been dropped or overturned.  
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be forgotten, while others question the link between the droit à l’oubli and the 
contemporary digital right to be forgotten.  
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1 THE LEGAL DIMENSION 
 
In this chapter, I argue that Rosen overemphasizes the jurisprudential roots of the digital 
right to be forgotten in France. My argument unfolds as follows.  
First, I point out that the right to be forgotten is an umbrella term, and I adopt a 
taxonomy developed by Voss (2016) that distinguishes between various forms of the 
right to be forgotten, both offline and online. I use this taxonomy to show that the right 
Rosen identifies as le droit à l’oubli is more accurately described as a right to judicial 
rehabilitation.  
I then argue that Rosen overstates his case by casting this French right to judicial 
rehabilitation as a natural antecedent to the present-day European right to be forgotten. 
I acknowledge that French law has, since the 1880s, afforded a right to judicial 
rehabilitation, although this right has never been absolute. I maintain, however, that the 
French right to judicial rehabilitation is too conceptually and functionally distinct from 
the European right to be forgotten to be cast as its “intellectual” inspiration.  
Lastly, I question whether French jurisprudence provides support for the 
European right to be forgotten at all. I analyze a recent case that came before the Cour 
de Cassation after the European Commission instituted the right to be forgotten, in which 
France broke from European jurisprudence by refusing to grant a deindexation request. 
This evidence weakens Rosen’s claim that the “intellectual roots” of the European right to 
be forgotten lie in French jurisprudence. Thus, we cannot sufficiently explain France’s 
fervent support for the European right to be forgotten simply by appealing to France’s 
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jurisprudential history. We must turn instead to extra-legal factors to explain France’s 
support of the right to be forgotten.  
Having outlined this chapter’s argument, I now introduce Voss (2016)’s taxonomy.  
1.1 A TAXONOMY OF THE RIGHTS TO BE FORGOTTEN  
 
Much of the disagreement on the right to be forgotten arises from the fact that there is 
not one right to be forgotten, but rather, several forms of it. Thus, when legal scholars 
reference the term, they actually describe one of several distinct rights; their arguments 
may or may not apply to the others. Voss (2016) has proposed the following taxonomy to 
distinguish between different forms of the right to be forgotten:  
 Right to rehabilitation: the right to oblivion of the judicial past, as established by a 
particular jurisdiction’s criminal code;  
 Right to erasure: the right to oblivion of personal information published publicly, 
as established by national data protection legislation; 
 Right to delisting: the right to have search results linking to personal information 
online delisted in certain circumstances;   
 Right to obscurity: the right to have personal data not deleted, but at least made 
less easy to find (usually through a combination of design-based privacy 
measures);    
 Right to digital oblivion: the right of an individual to request the suppression, 
removal, or other form of digital obliteration of personal data collected by 
information society services, such as social networks, browsers, or search 
engines.16  
The above taxonomy reveals that when Rosen references le droit à l’oubli, he actually 
means one distinct form of the right to be forgotten. Since Rosen describes a right 
established by a criminal code—a “right that allows a convicted criminal who has served 
                                                     
16 Voss and Renard, 298.  
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his time and been rehabilitated to object to the publication of the facts of his conviction 
and incarceration”—we can conclude that he is solely concerned with the right to 
(judicial) rehabilitation.  
 In the next section, I assess the extent to which French law affords a right to 
judicial rehabilitation.  
1.2 THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REHABILITATION IN FRENCH LAW  
 
In Victor Hugo’s 1862 novel, Les Misérables, ex-convict Jean Valjean struggles to find 
housing because of his criminal past:  
See here. My name is Jean Valjean. I am a convict from the galleys. I have 
passed nineteen years in the galleys. I was liberated four days ago, and am 
on my way to Pontarlier…This evening, when I arrived in these parts, I went 
to an inn, and they turned me out, because of my yellow passport…No one 
would take me. I went to the prison; the jailer would not admit me. I went 
into a dog's kennel; the dog bit me and chased me off, as though he had 
been a man.17 
This passage provides a clear example of the discrimination ex-convicts faced because of 
France’s early 19th century passeport jaune policy. Even though Valjean served his 
sentence for stealing a loaf of bread and is technically a free man, the law of the time 
required him to carry a yellow passport in public with details of his criminal record. As a 
result, he faced discrimination and ostracism.  
The events described in Les Misérables occured between 1815 and 1832. Had Jean 
Valjean’s story unfolded later in the century, he would have likely had better luck 
reintegrating into French society after serving his sentence.  
                                                     
17 Victor Hugo, Les Misérables, trans." Charles E. Wilbour (New York: Modern Library, 1992). 
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In the 1880s, the French Third Republic instituted judicial rehabilitation 
procedures to counter a national epidemic of recidivism. Criminal punishment practices 
that served to brand even the pettiest of former criminals as dangerous outcasts, such as 
the issuing of the infamous yellow passport, made it nearly impossible for former 
convicts to secure housing or employment. Former convicts that failed to reintegrate 
into society quickly returned to a life of crime. Senator René Bérenger introduced a 
series of laws expressly intended to interrupt this cycle and curb the rate of recidivism 
in France. One of these “Bérenger Laws” allowed for a prisoner who had exhibited good 
behavior to be conditionally released prior to his official release date. Furthermore, if 
the released convict expected his criminal record to constitute a considerable barrier to 
housing or employment, he could have the record expunged.18  
This expungement option—essentially a right to oblivion of the judicial past—is 
now codified in the French Penal Code. Chapter 3, Article 133 of the French Penal Code 
states that any person convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or petty offense possesses a 
right to judicial rehabilitation under certain conditions. These conditions include the 
requirement that convicted persons attempting to claim their right to judicial 
rehabilitation must have a clean record for at least five years after the dispatch of their 
fine or penalty, or for the entirety of the limitation period. While the French Penal Code 
does not explicitly define “judicial rehabilitation,” it does clarify that, once the 
convicted legal person acquires the right, the following article activates:  
                                                     
18 Penal Codes of France, Germany, Belgium and Japan: Reports Prepared for the International Prison 
Commission, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901, 14. 
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Any person who, in the exercise of his functions, has knowledge of 
criminal convictions, professional or disciplinary sanctions or 
prohibitions, forfeitures and incapacities erased by [rehabilitation] is 
prohibited from recalling their existence in any way whatsoever or to 
allow an indication of them to remain in any document.19  
 
In other words, France’s Penal Code affords a convicted person, under certain 
conditions, the ability to prevent individuals from publishing, or in any way publicizing, 
the facts related to his or her criminal history.  
Rosen’s claim that French law recognizes “a right that allows a convicted criminal 
who has served his time and been rehabilitated to object to the publication of the facts of 
his conviction and incarceration” merits consideration. But in this next section, I argue 
that he overemphasizes the jurisprudential connection between the right to judicial 
rehabilitation in French law and the present-day European right to be forgotten.  
The right to judicial rehabilitation is conceptually and functionally distinct from 
the European right to be forgotten. Conceptually, the two rights differ in their source 
and their scope. The former is afforded by a particular jurisdiction’s penal code—
whether it is local or national—and applies solely to the subject’s judicial past, or 
criminal history. The latter, in contrast, is afforded by national data protection 
legislation, and may be applied not only to criminal history, but to personal information 
and financial history as well. Functionally, the two rights differ in their purpose. The 
right to judicial rehabilitation exists solely to facilitate a convicted person’s 
reintegration into society. The European right to be forgotten, in contrast, attempts to 
                                                     
19 Article 133-11, French Penal Code.  
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shield sensitive personal information from public view. Conceptually and functionally, 
the French right to judicial rehabilitation referenced by Rosen is too far a cry from the 
European right to be forgotten to be considered its intellectual inspiration.  
To further support this claim, I offer an analysis of a late 20th century case in 
which the Cour de Cassation distinguished between a right to judicial rehabilitation and 
a broader right to information privacy. While the European right to be forgotten did not 
yet exist, the right to information privacy at the time had a similar purpose.  
1.2.1 The “Madame X” Case 
 
A historian published a book that identified a “Madame X” as both the mistress and 
informant of a Vichy Regime collaborator. Mme. X claimed that the historian violated 
her right to information privacy as well as her right to rehabilitation—the government 
had granted her a pardon in 1947—by publishing these details about her personal life. A 
lower court ruled in favor of Mme. X, ordering the removal of the offending passages 
from the book. Monsieur Kern, the author, appealed the decision and the Court of 
Appeals ruled in his favor, dismissing all of Mme. X's claims.20   
The case then came before the Cour de Cassation. The Cour de Cassation neither 
outright rejected nor upheld Mme. X’s right to be forgotten, but instead reasoned that 
Mme. X’s plea was “two-pronged.” The first prong claimed a violation of her right to 
information privacy. The second prong claimed a violation of her right to judicial 
                                                     
20 Cour de Cassation, Chambre civile 1, du 20 novembre 1990, 89-12.580, Publié au bulletin, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000007025
328&fastReqId=1892222860&fastPos=18.  
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rehabilitation, given that she had been pardoned for her involvement with the Vichy 
Regime years ago.21  
The court rejected the first claim, reasoning that Mme. X did not have a right to 
information privacy. The judicial proceedings from her 1947 pardon were circulated in 
the local press years ago, and thus the facts and personal information relevant to her 
Vichy cooperation already resided in the public sphere at the time of their republication 
by M. Kern. However, the court accepted her second claim, ruling that the republication 
of details regarding Mme. X’s personal life did infringe on her right to judicial 
rehabilitation, which had been afforded by her 1947 pardon. Following this reasoning, the 
Cour de Cassation “quashed and annulled” the Court of Appeal's decision, and sent this 
case back to the court of appeals level.22  
In issuing this split reasoning, the Cour de Cassation distinguished between two 
different versions of the right to be forgotten, the right to judicial rehabilitation, and the 
right to information privacy. The Cour de Cassation’s two-pronged legal reasoning in the 
“Madame X” case suggests that French jurisprudence distinguishes, at least implicitly, 
between the right to judicial rehabilitation and the right to information privacy. In fact, it 
may grant the narrower right to rehabilitation and simultaneously deny the broader right 
to information privacy. The Cour de Cassation’s legal reasoning in the Madame X case 
weakens Rosen’s claim that the French right to judicial rehabilitation serves as a 
jurisprudential model for the European right to be forgotten.  
                                                     
21 Cour de Cassation, Chambre civile 1, du 20 novembre 1990, 89-12.580.  
22 Cour de Cassation, Chambre civile 1, du 20 novembre 1990, 89-12.580.  
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1.3 THE RIGHT TO DELISTING IN FRENCH LAW  
 
In this section, I evaluate Lindsay’s assessment of the Frères X case, in which he asserts 
that the Cour de Cassation “apparently reject[s] the [right to be forgotten.]”23 While 
Lindsay makes the claim in passing and does not analyze the legal reasoning, I consider 
the Frères X case worth examination in detail. If the highest court in France did indeed 
reject the right to be forgotten after the European Commission established it, the 
conventional wisdom that French jurisprudence serves as intellectual ground zero for 
the right becomes particularly suspect. 
By assessing the legal reasoning of the Cour de Cassation decision in the case 
Lindsay cites—the “Freres X” case—I confirm Lindsay’s finding. After the European 
Commission instituted the right to be forgotten, France breaks from European 
jurisprudence by refusing to grant a deindexation request under the right to be forgotten. 
1.3.1 The “Frères X” Case  
 
A 2016 case brought before the Cour de Cassation illustrated some of the nuances in 
French jurisprudence under the right to be forgotten. In this case, a search for the 
plaintiffs’ family name on the search engine on the online version of the financial 
newspaper, Les Echos, returned a link to an archived newspaper article referencing the 
“X” brothers’ trouble with the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), a public French 
regulatory authority.24 MM. Stéphane and Pascal X requested that the site 1) remove 
their names from the article, and 2) deindex the article from the search results, claiming 
                                                     
23 Lindsay, “The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in European Data Protection Law,” 305.  
24 The AMF is the French equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  
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their right to object to the processing of any data related to them under Section 2, 
Article 38 of the law of January 6, 1978. The brothers brought the case before the Cour 
de Cassation after a Court of Appeals rejected their plea.25  
The Cour de Cassation upheld the Court of Appeals decision. It found that, since 
the facts of the article were true, the case presented a freedom of the press issue. The 
Court ruled that deindexing the article from search results would make it less 
accessible, thereby inappropriately restricting the freedom of the press. Furthermore, 
anonymizing the brothers’ names would have made the information “irrelevant and 
uninteresting.”26  
The Cour de Cassation’s ruling in the “Frères X” case represents a significant and 
uncharacteristic break with the European Union on the right to be forgotten. The case 
shares a key commonality with the Costeja v. Google Spain case that the European Court 
of Justice ruled on in 2014, in that the plaintiffs in both cases demanded a deindexing of 
search results linking to unflattering personal information. But France, arguably the 
most vocal advocate for the online right to be forgotten, refused to grant the right in a 
case brought before its highest domestic court.  
One might argue that the Cour de Cassation ruling aligns with the European 
Court of Justice decision because of the established EU “journalistic exception” to the 
right to delisting. This journalistic exception states:  
                                                     
25 Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 12 mai 2016, 15-17.729, Inédit, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechExpJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT0000325321
66&fastReqId=1892222860&fastPos=4.  
26 Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1, 12 mai 2016, 15-17.72.  
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Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the 
provisions of this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing 
of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose 
of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the 
right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.27  
 
In other words, the EU allows exemptions for news organizations from complying with 
right to be forgotten requests in order to safeguard the freedom of the press. Thus, it 
might be said that the Cour de Cassation dutifully applied the “journalistic exception” in 
the Frères X case.  
This analysis, however, has a cardinal flaw. With regards to the X brothers’ 
second petition to deindex the search results, the Les Echos website acted not solely as a 
journalistic tool, but also as “a data controller,” akin to Google in the Google Spain case. 
The definition of a “data controller,” under Article 2(d) of the European Data Protection 
Directive, is “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body 
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing 
of personal data.”28 In the Costeja v. Google Spain case, the ECJ ruled that Internet 
search engines constitute data controllers for the purposes of processing personal data, 
and must thus comply with legitimate requests for delisting. The Les Echos website, in 
its capacity as a search engine, acted more as a data controller than as an agent of the 
press. In this sense, the article revealing information about the X brothers should 
technically have been delisted. This analysis is not, however, uncontroversial. It is 
                                                     
27 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 
Judgement of the Court (High Chamber).  
28 “EU Article 29 Working Party Clarifies Definitions of ‘Data Controller’ and ‘Data Processor,’” Proskauer 
Privacy Law, March 29, 2010, http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2010/03/articles/european-union/eu-article-
29-working-party-clarifies-definitions-of-data-controller-and-data-processor/.  
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possible that in cases like this one, the journalistic exception trumps the technical 
definition of all search engines as data controllers. It also may be that the Les Echos 
website acted as a data controller, but that the balance of interests in the case still came 
out in favor of freedom of the press.  
Regardless of the particular legal analysis, the Frères X ruling, in which the 
plaintiffs were denied their appeal to have personal information delisted from a 
newspaper search engine, illustrates the fragmented—and often inconsistent—nature of 
French jurisprudence on the right to be forgotten. In particular, it highlights the tension 
between France and the European Union, as both entities strive to establish consistent 
judicial standards for deciding cases such as these. 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I assess two legal scholars’ claims regarding French jurisprudence 
on the right to be forgotten. Rosen (2012) argues that France has not only 
recognized an ancestor of the digital right to be forgotten—the droit à l’oubli—
throughout its history, but that the droit à l’oubli serves as a conceptual model for 
its contemporary descendant, the digital right to be forgotten. Lindsay (2012) 
points out that the French case law on the right to be forgotten is inconsistent, as 
evidenced by its rejection in the highest French court.  
 I find that Rosen (2012) overstates his case regarding the French 
jurisprudential roots of the European right to be forgotten, while Lindsay’s 
statement is more accurate. I say only “more accurate,” because both scholars fail 
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to recognize that French jurisprudence distinguishes between at least two types of 
“droits a l’oubli:” one that serves to reintegrate past criminal offenders into society, 
and another that serves to protect a data subject’s information privacy. 
In sum, we cannot sufficiently explain France’s fervent support for the European right 
to be forgotten by looking to the history of French jurisprudence. This is because French 
jurisprudence on the right to be forgotten is, at least, seriously fragmented. At most, 
French courts have outright denied the right to delisting. Thus, we must turn to extra-
legal factors to explain France’s support for the right to be forgotten. In the chapter that 
follows, I examine the neglected cultural dimension.  
 
 
 
  
 22 
2 THE CULTURAL DIMENSION   
 
At 6 PM on March 16, 1914, Gaston Calmette, the feisty editor-in-chief of France’s token 
right-of-center newspaper, Le Figaro, strolled into the newspaper’s headquarters. He had 
a friend in tow, novelist Paul Bourget, and intended to quickly pick up some documents 
to review later. Before he could enter his office, however, the secretary informed him that 
he had a surprise visitor waiting for him inside: Madame Henriette Caillaux. M. Calmette 
recognized the name. Madame Caillaux’s husband was Joseph Caillaux, the leader of 
France’s left-of-center Radical Party, and minister of finance at the time. Under M. 
Calmette’s direction, Le Figaro had spearheaded a ruthless months-long character 
assassination campaign against him. Three days prior, on March 13th, the newspaper had 
reached a new low, even by the Third Republic’s lenient journalistic standards. The front 
page of the March 13th issue prominently featured a copy of a love letter allegedly written 
by Joseph Caillaux thirteen years earlier to his then paramour and later first wife, 
Madame Berthe Gueydan. M. Caillaux had signed his love letter “Ton Jo” (“Your Joey”), an 
embarrassingly intimate pet name.29  
 M. Bourget urged M. Calmette to refuse the Madame’s visit; for what good could 
come of it? In response, M. Calmette scoffed that he could not refuse a woman. With 
that, the editor stepped into his office, promising that he would only be a few minutes, 
and shut the door behind him. 
                                                     
29 Edward Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, (University of California Press, 1992).  
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 There sat Mme. Caillaux, draped in a mink coat. As she eyed M. Calmette, she 
buried her hands deeper into the muff resting on her lap.  
 “You must know why I am here,” said Mme. Caillaux coolly. 
 “But I do not,” M. Calmette replied.  
 The Madame rose from her seat. She pulled a .32 caliber Browning automatic pistol 
out from under her mink muff, and fired six successive shots straight into the editor’s 
chest.  
 Within minutes, Le Figaro staffers and emergency professionals arrived at the 
horrific scene. The police seized a stoic and defiant Mme. Caillaux, her gun still smoking, 
as Gaston Calmette lay dying in a pool of blood.30 
 The trial of Madame Henriette Caillaux was nothing short of sensational. Historian 
Edward Berenson describes it as a courtroom drama “narrated by the capital's first 
chroniqueurs, drawn by an army of artists, photographed for the growing number of 
picture weeklies.”31 Mme. Caillaux testified that “the fear that her past moral violations 
would be revealed had upset her to the point of momentary derangement, to a loss of 
conscious will (volonté) that produced an unconscious act of violence.”32 Following seven 
days of theatrical testimony, the jury acquitted Mme. Caillaux after only 50 minutes of 
deliberation. 
                                                     
30 Berenson, An Affair to Remember. 
31 Berenson, An Affair To Remember.  
32 As cited in William M. Reddy, "Marriage, Honor, and the Public Sphere in Postrevolutionary France: 
Séparations De Corps, 1815-1848," The Journal of Modern History 65, no. 3 (1993): 437-72. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2124847. 
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 I begin this chapter by recounting the Caillaux affair because it depicts what I argue 
is an enduring French societal mentalité with respect to the sanctity of personal 
information. French individuals, be they subjects or citizens, rich or poor, are generally 
willing to go to great lengths to shield information about what they regard as their private 
affairs—chiefly their finances and dalliances—from public scrutiny. The motivation for 
doing so derives from a profound reverence for personal honor that can be traced back to 
the 16th century and a subsequent privileging of one’s social and economic reputation 
above all else. 
 Of course, Henriette Caillaux’s murderous outburst represents an extreme reaction 
to the specter of public dishonor. Most French individuals, rather than take matters into 
their own hands, prefer to turn to the state to safeguard their reputations from public 
scrutiny. From the 18th century onward, amid periods of heightened public scrutiny into 
their private affairs, French citizens have repeatedly looked to the state to serve as an 
enabler and enforcer of safeguards to shield their private life. While the format of the 
relationship between the French state and its constituent societal units —be they 
communities, families, or individuals—have transformed over time, the ethos of the 
relationship has not. Time and time again, the French state has embraced its role as a 
controller and protector of personal information. The enthusiastic support offered by the 
French government in favor of an online right to be forgotten simply represents the latest 
iteration of this isochronal dynamic between the modern French state and French society.  
 This chapter unfolds as follows. First, I demonstrate the pervasiveness of concerns 
about personal and familial honor in ancien régime France and discuss the available 
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recourse for individuals to preserve their reputations during this period. Here, I focus on 
the infamous lettre de cachet. Revolutionaries’ and scholars’ categorical denunciation of 
the lettre de cachet as an arbitrary exercise of royal authority for the benefit of the elites, 
while not entirely inaccurate, has obscured the degree of public support for, and 
widespread use of, the administrative procedure among ordinary French citizens. The 
state’s issuance of lettres de cachet satisfied, at least in part, public appeals from French 
families for a means to discreetly protect their treasured reputations.  
 Then, I move to the post-revolutionary period. I demonstrate that democratization 
and the rise of liberal individualism heightened rather than dampened concerns over 
reputation in French society. As societal dynamics shift, the individual’s social network 
becomes denser and more vast, but he begins to emerge as a distinct, identifiable node 
within it. Concurrently, increasing literacy rates and the greater availability of books and 
newspapers—facilitated by the printing press—allow information to disseminate and 
subsist beyond the immediate community. As a result, the individual experiences a 
heightened public scrutiny into what he regards as his private affairs: his finances and his 
dalliances, among other things. Once again, just as with the lettre de cachet, the French 
state comes to the individual’s rescue, articulating a series of laws on press defamation—
the Serre Laws—that metaphorically “wall off” his private affairs from public scrutiny.   
 It would be a gross simplification to cast the lettre de cachet and the Serre laws as 
the lineal ancestors of the present right to be forgotten. Rather, this chapter merely 
attempts to highlight a singular continuity between the three: the lettre de cachet, the 
Serre Laws, and the online right to be forgotten are all the product of the same dynamic. 
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To maintain their dignity, ordinary French citizens assent to cede some degree of liberty 
to the state in exchange for state protection of their private affairs. 
2.1 A HISTOIRE DES MENTALITÉS APPROACH TO STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS   
 
To demonstrate this chapter’s thesis, I employ a histoire des mentalités approach to 
cultural history. The term, histoire des mentalités, denotes a particular style of 
historiography associated with the 20th century French historians of the Annales School, 
namely Georges Duby and Roger Chartier. The Annales historians were at once 
disenchanted with the majority of their colleagues’ exclusive concentration on politics, 
diplomacy, wars, and “great men”—a concentration they disdainfully dubbed l’histoire 
éventuelle—and hostile to the ever-multiplying early 20th century Marxist 
historiographical approaches for their singular and deterministic focus on class. They 
pledged to develop a historiography of the “total human experience.”33 As Duby 
described, this paradigm “relegated the sensational to the sidelines and was reluctant to 
give a simple accounting of events, but strived on the contrary to pose and solve problems 
and, neglecting surface disturbances, to observe the long and medium-term evolution of 
economy, society and civilisation.”34 In other words, so as to best capture the total human 
experience, this new historiography emphasized change and continuity in the collective 
social and cultural mentalités, rather than dramatic episodic events or individual 
biographies.  
                                                     
33 Alfred J. Andrea, “Mentalities in History,” The Historian, vol. 53, no. 3 (1991): 605, 
www.jstor.org/stable/24448162. 
34 Georges Duby, Le dimanche de Bouvines, Paris (1973): Forward.  
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 While there is considerable variation between the approaches of individual Annales 
scholars, the method of histoire des mentalités generally includes the following: a focus on 
collective rather than individual attitudes; an emphasis on “unconscious assumptions” 
and “everyday thought,” in addition to conscious thoughts and articulated opinions; and 
“a concern with a structure of beliefs as well as their content… with how people think as 
well as what they think.”35 This approach is well suited to my study. My central research 
question—“Why do the French approach the problem of digital eternity the way they 
do?”—is ultimately a question about mentalités.  
2.2 SIMPLY TO DIE FOR: HONOR AND REPUTATION IN ANCIEN RÉGIME FRANCE  
 
The ancien régime French conception of “honneur” developed on both external and 
internal planes. On one hand, it referred to the external symbols of esteem conferred on 
noblemen to indulge the customs and codes of civility in the court. On the other hand, it 
invoked a sense of internal virtue—the moral, spiritual, and social codes of conduct 
decreed by the Code of Chivalry and the Catholic Church. For each individual, external 
and internal honor intersected and coalesced to form a discernable reputation, a public 
perception of one’s honor.  
 The author of Le véritable tableau de la calomnie reveals the sacrosanct gravity of an 
individual’s reputation at this time: “Ruining a man’s reputation is more evil than taking 
bread out of a pauper’s mouth. In the latter case, it is merely a question of one’s body. In 
                                                     
35 Peter Burke, "Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of Mentalities," History of European Ideas 7, no. 5 
(1986): 439. 
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the former, it is a question of one’s soul, which is more precious.”36 Here, the author 
considers a man’s reputation to be a spiritual possession. Accordingly, he condemns 
calumny—the making of a statement for the express purpose of damaging someone’s 
reputation—as the most egregious kind of offense, a slight to man’s very soul. 
 The preoccupation with honor and reputation was not limited to knights and 
courtesans. On the contrary, reputation constituted the backbone of the economy in the 
French countryside. By the 16th century, the French countryside had a fairly sophisticated 
network of local market economies, most of which possessed a credit system. One 
developed credit, and thus gained access to the market, by developing a reputation as a 
reliable and rational market actor. Skill at one’s craft, for example, was considered 
honorable. As David Rivault de Fleurence, a French humanist and royal attendant to 
Louis XIII observed, “[c]ar il n’est rien plus honorable au Tailleur, que faire l’abit bien 
proportionnement au corps.”37 Even for poor subsistence farmers and domestic workers, 
debt history defined the extent to which they could participate in the local economy.38 For 
those who did not have access to the external honorifics, titles, and privileges bestowed 
upon noblemen, the economic dimensions of honor and reputation were essential.  
 Individuals from all walks of life would go to great lengths to protect their social and 
economic reputations. In his Treatise on the Point of Honor, Antoine de Courtin suggests 
                                                     
36 Le Véritable tableau de la calomnie et le portraict des médisans, exposez en public, par la vertu triomphante 
du vice, avec un discour moral sur le mesme sujet (1649). 
37 Arlette Jouanna, "Recherches sur la notion d'honneur au XVIème siècle," Revue d'histoire moderne et 
contemporaine (1954-) 15, no. 4 (1968): 600. “There is nothing more honorable to the tailor, then finding the 
proper proportions for the body.” 
38 Philip T. Hoffman, Growth in a Traditional Society: the French Countryside, 1450-1815 (Princeton 
University Press, 2000): 73. 
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that an honorable man, no matter his rank, would rather die than go on living with a 
tarnished reputation: “Ask anyone what it means to possess honor, and he will tell you 
that it means to have heart. Ask what it means to have heart, and he will tell you that it is 
to die rather than suffer a wrong.”39 Indeed, among Frenchmen of equal standing, the 
duel to the death constituted the default recourse to restore a lost “point d’honneur.” The 
French cultivated a particular affinity for dueling; between 1600 and 1789, an estimated 
400,000 Frenchmen were killed in private duels.40 The fatal practice eventually gained so 
much traction that the King’s administration decided to officially intervene. Henry IV, 
Louis XIII, and Louis XIV all published scores of edicts banning dueling, but their 
administrations enforced the edicts loosely, because, as one scholar notes, “[b]y the 
middle of the 17th century, dueling was so entrenched in the French nature that no 
amount of legal condemnation could halt its progress.”41 
 The French conception of honneur—which developed during the ancien régime— 
constituted the foundation of distinctly French attitudes toward information privacy. 
French citizens established their consideration of reputation and honor as fundamentally 
valuable moral goods and demonstrated the great lengths they were willing to go in order 
to protect them.  
2.3 THE 18TH CENTURY: PRIVATE HONOR BECOMES THE BUSINESS OF PUBLIC 
AUTHORITY 
 
                                                     
39 Courtin, Treatise on the Point of Honor, as cited in Markku Peltonen, The Duel in Early Modern England: 
Civility, Politeness and Honour (London: Cambridge University Press, 2013).   
40 Nick Evangelista, The Encyclopedia of the Sword, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995, 195. 
41 Ibid. 
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Concerns about honor and reputation reached a fever pitch in the 18th century. Those who 
migrated from the country to the city during this time period came from the lowest rungs 
of society—many were hired laborers in their previous lives.42 Compared to their feudal 
counterparts, city-dwellers cultivated a particularly communal conception of honor that 
proved difficult to safeguard in the precarious urban environment. In the city, as life 
became compartmentalized into home, work, and leisure, the family unit became the 
locus of private life. As a result, the individual’s reputation was derived not from personal 
titles, honorifics, or economic reliability, but rather from an evaluation of the moral 
character of his domestic household members. The dishonorable relative who “stained 
the honor of the household in this world” by engaging in licentious behavior would “be 
damned in the next,”43 for a serious crime or offense by a family member could compel 
the entire family to change its name, disqualify its members from public office, or result 
in exile of the entire family.44 
 As urban family units lived in increasingly close proximity to one another, private 
life became subject to constant scrutiny and interference from neighbors. In his journals, 
Jean-Charles-Pierre-Lenoir, the lieutenant general of police in Paris from 1776 to 1785, 
described Paris as a “large city, in which societies of all kinds mingle and men and women 
live in one another’s almost constant presence.”45 The typical apartment house was a 
                                                     
42 Arlette Farge, Vivre dans la rue à Paris au XVIIIe siècle, Editions Gallimard, 2014, 571. 
43 Michel Foucault and Arlette Farge, Le désordre des familles. Lettres de cachet des Archives de la Bastille au 
XVIIIe siècle, Editions Gallimard, 2014, 73. 
44 Ibid., 74. 
45 Lenoir, as quoted in Arlette Farge, “The Honor and Secrecy of Families,” in Roger Chartier et al., A History 
of Private Life: Passions of the Renaissance, Vol. 3. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 576. 
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“public theater” in which “marital disputes, illicit love affairs, noisy tenants, restless 
children—nothing could be concealed and everything could be heard.”46 This ambiguity 
between private and public space, coupled with the dearth of economic resources and 
opportunities for social mobility, ingrained in city-dwellers a particularly relativist 
conception of honor. As one scholar describes life in the city, “[i]t was as if there was a 
fixed quantity of honor in the world and that securing one’s portion of it had to be at the 
expense of others.”47 Amid this mass of struggling equals, individuals vied desperately for 
the esteem of their neighbors. 
 In addition to the heightened scrutiny of private affairs by neighbors, the 
administrative structure of the Parisian neighborhood also opened up city-dwellers to 
surveillance from local public authorities: namely, the neighborhood police force and the 
local parish. The 18th century Parisian neighborhood was not merely a component of the 
larger city, but an autonomous jurisdiction with rules, laws, and authorities of its own. 
The chief constable, or commissaire, was the ultimate watchdog of public security. To 
ensure peace and order throughout the neighborhood, the commissaire and his team kept 
the neighborhood under constant surveillance. The parish priest, along with his acolytes 
and deacons, who often had particular insight into the illicit or immoral activities of 
neighborhood residents, aided the commissaire with this task. Police archives from the 
                                                     
46 Ibid. 
47 Charles Walton, Policing Public Opinion in the French Revolution: The Culture of Calumny and the Problem 
of Free Speech (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), 42. 
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time contain “certificates of clean living” issued by the church to previously suspect 
residents.48 
  But despite the impunity with which the neighborhood police force scrutinized 
residents’ private affairs, the commissaire—because of his status as a local authority and 
fellow resident of the community—“generally enjoyed the confidence of the people.” For 
local residents in need of dispute resolution, he served as the primary contact person:   
[I]n time of trouble the commissaire's house (practically all seventeenth-century 
officials did their work from their residences) loomed as large as Gibraltar. 
Ordinarily, a criminal case began with someone knocking on the door of the 
nearest commissaire and lodging a complaint against a fellow citizen. The 
commissaire's address was well known to residents of his quartier, and he was 
supposed to be available day and night to hear grievances and settle disputes.49 
 
The expectation here that the commissaire “be available day and night to hear grievances 
and settle disputes” reveals that mediating conflicts between residents constituted a 
central component of his job. Furthermore, the disputes brought before the commissaire 
were of an increasingly personal nature, often having to do with complicated inter-family 
rivalries and conflicts.  
 Mid-18th century police archives reveal irritation not just in response to the growing 
number of complaints involving “points of honor” between neighbors, but in response to 
the proliferation of “domestic disputes” as well. According to Lenoir, “[i]l y avait peu de 
familles de Paris parmi lesquelles il ne se trouvât aucune personne qui dans un espace de 
dix à douze années n’eût à recourir au magistrat administrateur de la police générale de 
                                                     
48 Farge, “The Honor and Secrecy of Families,” 578.  
49 Léon Bernard, The Emerging City: Paris in the Age of Louis XIV (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), 77. 
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cette ville, pour des affaires concernant son honneur.”50 Indeed, the majority of Lenoir’s 
200 weekly petitions concerned domestic affairs—disputes between husband and wife or 
among parents and disobedient children—which had traditionally been dealt with as 
discreetly as possible within the confines of the private sphere.51 It is worth noting the 
emergence of state involvement in domestic disputes because it helps illustrate the ways 
in which the state developed its apparatus of control over personal information. In the 
next section, I will explore a specific case study that demonstrates this evolution of state 
control.    
 In sum, 18th century city-dwellers were far more likely than their aristocratic or 
country-dwelling counterparts to seek help from the state to settle domestic disputes and 
private points of honor. City-dwellers by no means abstained from resorting to violence 
when a compatriot threatened their reputations; a study of the Châtelet’s archives, for 
example, revealed that roughly 32 percent of affairs on the docket of the petit criminal in 
1770 qualified as injures—insulting speech offenses—accompanied by violence.52 In 
general, however, the emergence of the family unit as the locus of private life, coupled 
with the community’s heightened scrutiny into the affairs of the family, spurred families 
to reach out to the state for protection. For its part, the state granted the request for aid. 
It now possessed both a compelling interest—the maintenance of order in the cutthroat 
and crowded city—and the sufficient administrative apparatus—the community police 
                                                     
50 Lenoir, as cited in André Burguière, “L'état monarchique et la famille (xvie -xviiie siècle),” Annales. 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 2/2001 (56e année), 313-335. “There are few families in Paris among which, in the 
space of twelve years, no member has gone to the police of the city for affairs concerning their honor.” 
51 Bernard, The Emerging City, 45. 
52 Watson, “Policing Public Opinion,” Footnote 53, 253.   
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force – to do so. The growing role of the commissaire during this period marked the 
state’s entrance into the regulation and control of personal information, especially for the 
purpose of safeguarding reputation.   
2.3.1 The Lettre de Cachet de Famille 
 
In situations where an insulted family member was guilty, the only way to salvage the 
family reputation was to publicly condemn the culprit.53 Heads of households often 
lodged complaints regarding the immoral or illegal behavior of their family members, 
bringing their grievances to the commissaire. If the family reputation was so seriously 
damaged that not even the constable’s damage control diffused the situation, the family 
could file a formal complaint against the errant family member to submit him for public 
judgment and punishment. The purpose of such a complaint was to publicly distance the 
family from the individual, and to deter the individual from continuing his immoral 
behavior. But filing such a complaint was a double-edged sword because justice was 
administered in public. Even if it succeeded in publicly reprimanding and embarrassing 
the family member, the event left a permanent blemish on the family reputation.   
 Luckily for 18th century families seeking to keep their domestic scandals out of the 
public eye, there was an alternate recourse for filing public complaints with the 
commissaire: the lettre de cachet de famille. The lettre de cachet was an official order 
granted by the royal administration for the imprisonment or exile of an individual 
                                                     
53 Farge, The Honor and Secrecy of Families,” 585. 
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without public trial or proceedings.54 The curious history of French citizens’ attitudes 
toward this administrative practice reveals the lengths that ordinary French families were 
willing to go in order to preserve their good names.  
 The practice of issuing lettres de cachet gained widespread notoriety during the 
revolutionary period. Political journalists penned diatribes lambasting the practice as an 
arbitrary and despotic abuse of power. Robespierre and others spread fear about the lettre 
de cachet en blanc, purporting that royal ministers received stacks of blank forms to 
arbitrarily “fill in with the names of those odious or suspect to them.”55 But although most 
revolutionaries vehemently denounced the lettre de cachet as politically motivated—a 
tool for the corrupt royal administration to arbitrarily silence political dissidents—the 
lettres de cachet issued to political dissidents for suspected sedition, espionage, and other 
politically motivated acts were actually quite rare. Historians estimate that only two or 
three out of every thousand lettres issued in the provinces concerned political matters. 
Indeed, over 97 percent of lettres de cachet were lettres de cachet de famille, issued to 
family members who wrote requesting punishment without public proceeding of a 
particular errant family member.56 
 For the patriarch of the household, the lettre de cachet served as a preventative tool 
to preserve family honor. In many of their placets (request letters), the complainant 
mentions the possible threat to the family’s honor as a catalyst for requesting 
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imprisonment of the errant family member. In a 1728 placet found in the Archives de 
Bastille, locksmith Gabriel Seray and his wife, Anne Charlotte, request an order for 
imprisonment of their daughter, Anne Catherine Seray. According to the placet, Anne 
Catherine Seray had split from her husband and lived with a widowed carpenter in Paris. 
The couple words their request as follows:  
Comme cette conduite est honteuse, qui déshonore souverainement sa famille, et 
que les suppliants avec toutes leurs défenses et leur soins n’ont pu y remédier et la 
mettre dans la bonne voie, au contraire, ayant lieu de craindre des suites encore 
plus fâcheuses ils supplient très humblement Votre Grandeur de vouloir bien 
autoriser un ordre anticipé pour faire renfermer à l’hôpital ladite Anne Catherine 
Seray leur fille, en attendant un ordre du Roi pour y être détenue jusqu'à ce qu’elle 
soit corrigée de ses inclinations libertines, et ils ne cesseront leurs prières pour la 
conservation de Votre Grandeur.57        
 
The Serays explicitly state their reason for requesting the lettre: Anna Catherine’s 
shameful behavior risked dishonoring the family name. It is worth noting that the Seray 
family members were working-class, indicating that members of the elite class were not 
the only ones who treasured family honor. Indeed, while the revolutionaries liked to 
portray the lettre de cachet as a means by which corrupt political authorities could silence 
and oppress the weak and the poor, the reality was that most lettres de cachets were 
issued to modest people such as the Serays, and were sometimes issued to even the very 
poor. Police Chief Berryer characterized the lettre de cachet as “a service to honest people 
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so that the disorderliness of their relatives does not reflect upon them.”58 In mid-18th 
century France, family honor concerned all strati of society. 
 Close analysis of the history surrounding the lettre de cachet resolves a common 
mischaracterization of French attitudes toward privacy. While the French state certainly 
utilized the lettre de cachet as a means of control, the practice was less authoritarian than 
it might seem. The lettre de cachet de famille fulfilled a need expressed by French subjects 
for a government apparatus capable of controlling and protecting personal information. 
French families not only assented to government intervention into their private affairs 
with the administrative practice; they embraced it. These families preferred to preserve 
family honor and secrecy, even at the expense of submitting to an arbitrary and absolute 
exercise of power.  
 The story of the lettre de cachet illustrates the historical prioritization of French 
social values. Noblemen and peasants alike valued privacy and dignity over autonomy in 
ancien régime France. While I do not claim that these attitudes are universal or without 
nuance, we can observe a link between the social environment that spawned the 18th 
century lettres de cachet and the contemporary social environment that generated 
widespread support of the online right to be forgotten.  
 
2.4 THE 19TH CENTURY: THE STATE WALLS OFF THE PRIVATE SPHERE 
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Those familiar with European history might at first be skeptical of a purported continuity 
in French societal mentalités toward honor and reputation from the 18th century to the 
present day.  Historians often cite the presence of an “honor culture” as a hallmark of an 
“unmodern” state and society.59 They also credit the political and social reforms of the 
French Revolution for the birth of the modern state. According to this conventional 
wisdom, shouldn’t the political and social reforms of the French Revolution—in other 
words, the institution of characteristically “modern” state-society relations in France—
have eliminated the fervent honor culture of ancien régime France?  
 Indeed, the revolution ushered in two phenomena that one might expect to have 
dampened the obsession of the French middle class with family honor and reputation: the 
collapse of the absolute monarchy and the subsequent establishment of transparent 
democratic institutions. During the Revolution, dissidents lambasted government 
interference in citizens’ private affairs. After the collapse of the monarchy, the new 
Republic put checks in place to curtail future interference. The reformers of the 
Napoleonic era abolished the lettre de cachet, opened all courtrooms to the public, 
eliminated police backing for the authority of fathers over the family, and made private 
all commercial entities, which had previously been subject to the public regulation of the 
guilds.60 As one scholar writes, these reforms made it so “every worthy male citizen, 
irrespective of birth or rank, could distinguish himself by bravery in defense of the 
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fatherland or, analogously, by arduous public service.”61 One would think that privileging 
civic participation over social or economic virtue—in concert with the abolishment of 
royal honorifics—would dampen concern for social and economic reputation.  
 This assumption, however, is mistaken. The political and social reforms of the 
revolutionary period, rather than diminish concerns over social and economic reputation 
in France, amplified them. In a series of case studies on 19th century marital separation 
trials, historian William Reddy concludes the following:  
These two cases reveal the superiority, from the point of view of family honor, of 
the infamous lettre de cachet of the eighteenth century… The procedure was 
entirely private, and therefore facts could be revealed to the police without fear of 
insult. These cases suggest that the highly expanded and accessible court system 
produced by the Revolution offered husbands and wives protections they might 
well hesitate to use.62   
 
Here, Reddy draws attention to the durability of societal mentalités, particularly with 
regards to the prerevolutionary French conception of honor among the working and 
middle classes. The revolutionaries’ reformation of French laws and institutions in the 
name of democratic transparency rendered the administration of justice more rational 
and egalitarian, but it also made it less discreet.  
 Amid these institutional reforms, the ancien régime mentalité among the working 
and middle-classes regarding the importance of reputation and the sanctity of familial 
honor remained intact. French encyclopedic entries on honneur from the period highlight 
this continuity. The 1885 Littré Dictionnaire, for example, includes in its definition of 
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honor the following: “In speaking of a husband, honor [refers to] the good reputation 
reflected on him by his wife’s fidelity.”63 The 1873 edition of the Larousse Grand 
Dictionnaire similarly notes that, in post-revolutionary France, honneur did not refer 
principally to the public and political functions of the members of a family, as it did in 
Rome, but rather, to the private virtue of the family, as defined by each family member’s 
moral character.  
 In sum, the reforms of the revolutionary period, rather than doing away with the 
ancien régime honor culture, had the paradoxical effect of democratizing the French 
mentalité with regards to the sanctity of social and economic reputation. For working-
class and middle-class families accustomed to utilizing a discreet recourse for curtailing 
threats to family reputation—the lettre de cachet de famille—a tension emerges between 
their privileging of family virtue and the unapologetically indiscreet character of the post-
revolutionary court.64 
 With the advent of the industrial printing press and increasing literacy rates among 
the working and middle-classes, calumny concerning the finances and dalliances of the 
individual began to circulate and linger in the farthest reaches of his sprawling social 
network. The budding press capitalized on newly public court proceedings by creating an 
entire genre of journals—the mémoires judiciaires—devoted to dramatizing courtroom 
happenings. By utilizing popular language and literary references, the mémoires 
judiciaires cultivated a much wider, more general readership than the professional legal 
                                                     
63 Andrea Mansker, Sex, Honor and Citizenship in Early Third Republic France, Springer, 2011, 9. 
64 William M. Reddy, "Marriage, Honor, and the Public Sphere in Postrevolutionary France: Séparations de 
corps, 1815-1848," The Journal of Modern History 65, no. 3 (1993): 437. 
 41 
journals of the 18th century.65 Furthermore, even the established and professional legal 
journals indulged in titillating coverage of “courtroom melodrama” to gain access to a 
wider readership.  
 Economic reputation was also paramount during this period. An entire genre of 
newspapers emerged in the early nineteenth-century devoted primarily to disseminating 
information on the reputations of local merchants. These newspapers—among them Le 
Tocsin and La Gazette, defending the interest of creditors, and Pauvre Jacques and La 
Gazette de Saint-Pélagie, defending the interests of debtors—revolutionized the manner 
in which middle-class commercial actors understood and discussed economic 
reputation.66  
 Previously, economic reputation had spread chiefly by word-of-mouth and local 
gossip and remained confined to closed professional networks. Now, a market actor’s 
economic reputation circulated independently beyond the immediate professional 
network to the wider public sphere, and remained accessible to anyone who could 
procure a copy.67 Creditors’ newspapers provided information to subscribers on 
individuals’ credit history, while debtors’ newspapers publicized creditors’ acts of cruelty, 
or provided forums to criticize the treatment in debtors’ prisons. Following the rise of the 
local commercial press, an “economy of regard” emerged among the 19th-century 
merchant middle-class. Rather than turn on the “pure financial calculation” of a modern, 
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free market economy, this class still operated according to the “status-bound 
transactions” of a bona-fide honor culture.68 
  In sum, the Revolution’s democratization of the honor code and the newly public 
character of its institutions, rather than eliminating the concern for honor and 
reputation, fortified their centrality in French society. This phenomenon is illustrated by 
the lettre de cachet de famille, an early example of French citizens’ willingness to cede 
their individual liberties to the state in exchange for protection of personal information. 
Having chronicled the heightened public scrutiny to their private affairs to which French 
citizens were subject to in the post-revolutionary era, I now examine the second part of 
the isochronal dynamic, in which the French state comes to its citizens’ rescue.  
2.4.1 The Serre Laws 
 
The decades following the Revolution constituted a period of political upheaval in France. 
As the country’s officials struggled to reach consensus and establish stable political 
institutions, the French press cycled through periods of unbridled liberty and stiff 
censorship. In 1819, with a press still reeling from the draconian restrictions instituted 
under Napoleon I’s reign, French legislative officials, under the behest of three of the 
liberty-obsessed “Doctrinaires”—Pierre Francois Hercule de Serre, Pierre Paul Royer-
Collard, and Francois Guizot—engaged in an animated debate on a series of three laws on 
press defamation. Scholars generally credit these laws, dubbed the Serre laws, with 
liberalizing the press regime. Indeed, the Serre laws did place the press under the 
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jurisdiction of common law and abolish strict Napoleonic-era requirements for 
journalistic licensing.69 A close reading of the Doctrinaires’ legislative discourses on the 
Serre laws reveals, however, that even these political champions of liberty struggled, in 
designing the Serre laws, to negotiate the proper balance between the enduring societal 
expectation that the French state safeguard the honor and dignity of the private 
individual with the defense of public’s right to know, as well as the press’s right to 
freedom of expression. 
 For the Doctrinaires, a free press served an instrumental social and political 
function. In his 1814 essay, Quelques idées sur la liberté de presse, Guizot declared the 
following:  
For modern societies that aspire to political liberty, freedom of the press is 
an essential need, a true necessity… Regardless of how one conceives of it, a 
need, fact, or right, freedom of the press is only of the new elements of this 
new social state… The same causes have imposed or will impose… civil 
equality, liberty of conscience, individual freedom, the responsibility of 
executive power, freedom of the press, and all the institutions which must 
guarantee them.70 
 
Here, Guizot champions freedom of the press as one of the constitutive elements of a 
modern representative democracy. Rather than balancing it against potential competing 
values, such as personal honor and social reputation, he places it in an elite cadre of 
nonnegotiable democratic principles, such as civil equality and liberty of conscience. 
Guizot’s colleague, Royer-Collard, espoused a similar reverence for the free press in his 
legislative discourses: “Ainsi, dans l’état des choses, la démocratie ne se protège que par la 
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liberté de la presse. Si elle la perd, elle tombe dans l’esclavage politique le plus absolu.”71 
Royer-Collard’s hyperbolic proclamation that, without freedom of the press, democracy 
would devolve into “l’esclavage politique” (political slavery) reveals that he considered 
freedom of the press the ultimate check against tyranny. Allowing the press to report on 
the actions of elected public officials, was, after all, what kept those public officials 
accountable to the public. The Doctrinaires firmly believed in freedom of the press as a 
fundamental political institution of the modern state. In France’s budding representative 
democracy, this conviction earned them a reputation as ultimate defenders of freedom of 
expression and the public’s right to know.     
 During the parliamentary discourses on the Serre laws, even these most valiant 
defenders of press freedom wavered between privileging the private individual’s honor 
and reputation, and privileging free speech and the public interest. One such vacillation 
occurred during discussion on the “exception de vérité,” ensconced in Article 20 of the 
second Serre law. This exception sought to establish protections for the press from 
defamation lawsuits in cases where they publish truthful and relevant information. In 
particular, the legislature struggled to decide the proper scope of the legislation with 
regards to truthful allegations about public officials.  
 On April 27, 1819, Pierre Paul Royer-Collard insisted that the press should refrain 
from publishing even true statements about a person’s private life because the 
individual’s private life is “murée,” or walled-off: “Voilà donc la vie privée murée, et si je 
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puis me servir de cette expression, elle est déclarée invisible, elle est renfermée dans 
l’intérieur des maisons. Maintenant la question est de savoir si vous murerez de la même 
manière la vie publique, et si vous la déclarerez également invisible.”72 Royer-Collard’s 
statement constitutes the first explicit articulation in French legislative history of the 
notion of “la vie privée” as a realm distinct from the public sphere. In explicitly carving 
out this public vs. private distinction with regards to the publication of personal 
information, Royer-Collard sided uncharacteristically with the private individual.  
 Later on during the very same legislative debate, however, Royer-Collard reverted to 
his usual pro-liberty position. This time, he vehemently objected to a proposal for an 
absolute ban of the publication of facts related to the lives of public figures:  
Il suit du principe de l’article, Messieurs, que si vous muriez la vie publique, 
si vous déclariez qu’il n’est pas permis de dire qu’un fonctionnaire public a 
fait ce qu’il a fait, a dit ce qu’il dit en tant qu’homme public, vous 
reconnaitriez que la puissance publique lui appartient comme la vie privée 
appartient à chaque particulier…Cette conséquence est insoutenable.73 
 
Here, Royer-Collard argued that forbidding the publication of facts related to the lives of 
public figures amounts to walling off the public sphere, a consequence he considers 
reprehensible. In Royer-Collard’s view, the voluntary acceptance of a public position, and 
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all of its attendant duties, nullifies (or at least significantly diminishes) the protection of 
individual privacy regularly afforded to members of the French public.  
 Royer-Collard’s contradictory speech on the exception de vérité echoed the budding 
struggle in French representative democracy to balance competing values: an individual’s 
right to personal honor and dignity in the private sphere with the press’s freedom of 
expression and the public’s right to know in the public sphere. With the Serre Laws, the 
French Parliament arrived at a compromise, admitting a decidedly narrow version of the 
proposed exception de vérité into law. The narrow version of the exception distinguished 
between truthful facts relating to an individual’s public function, and truthful facts 
unrelated to an individual’s private life. The press could report the former without risking 
a defamation lawsuit, but the latter remained off-limits. 
 In the current debate on the right to be forgotten, France struggles once again to 
determine which categories of personal information should trigger the state’s efforts to 
safeguard personal honor, and which should trigger a defense of the press’s freedom of 
expression and the public’s right to know. This time, the problem of digital discoverability 
further complicates the state’s responsibility. In the cybersphere, information about an 
individual’s private life is easily accessible and persistent. When the distinction between 
the public and private spheres becomes so fluid, how can the French state reliably 
delineate the sacrosanct, invisible “la vie privée murée” that French citizens have come to 
expect?  
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2.5 CONCLUSION  
The two case studies presented in this chapter—the first on the 18th century 
administrative practice of the lettre de cachet de famille, and second on the 1819 Serre 
laws—reflect the values that France strives to preserve as it enters a new digital age. The 
advent of the lettre de cachet illustrated the willingness of French citizens to cede liberty 
for state protection of personal and familial reputation. Parisian families sought out and 
assented to an arbitrary royal administrative practice in order to protect their honor and 
dignity. This consequently accelerated state regulation of personal information. Later on, 
the passage of the Serre laws cemented the distinction between private and public life.   
 It is important to note that this chapter’s account of the cultural dimension 
illuminates merely one explanatory factor for France’s current support for the right to be 
forgotten. The enduring societal expectation that the state safeguard citizens from 
unsolicited public scrutiny may, in part, inform France’s present attitude toward the right 
to be forgotten, However, the cultural explanation falls short in one aspect.  
 France is not entirely unique among European countries in privileging the 
individual’s right to private life over the public’s right to know. Several other countries in 
Europe have developed a similar cadre of what scholars term “personality rights.” 
Personality rights refer to a loose body of legislation and jurisprudence, often identifiable 
in civil law countries, that intersect to enshrine and safeguard individuals’ personal 
“dignity, honor, and the right to private life.”74 Meg Leta Jones notes that at least two 
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other European civil law countries besides France—Germany and Italy—“embrace a 
notion of redemption by which an individual may preclude another from identifying him 
or her in relation to his or her past.”75 A rich history and cultural privileging of personality 
rights is thus necessary, but not sufficient, in explaining France’s particularly fervent 
support for a digital right to be forgotten.  
 The cultural dimension identified in this chapter represents a fundamental, but 
incomprehensive, justification for France’s fervent support of an extraterritorial right to 
delisting. This is evident when we compare France to its European civil law counterparts 
with similarly rich mentalités favoring personality rights. To identify the additional 
factors that complete our explanation, we must turn to an arena where France is unique:  
the political dimension.  
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3 THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
 
On March 20, 1998, France put the Internet on trial. In front of a public audience at the 
Paris Palais de Justice, the France chapter of the Internet Society (ISOC France), under 
the direction of Bruno Oudet, sponsored a two-day long mock trial of the Internet. 
Approximately seventy people participated in the trial, including expert witnesses, 
lawyers, and a jury comprised of public and private sector technology professionals. The 
participants included Gérard Miller, a French psychiatrist, Arnaud Brunet, lead counsel 
for IBM Europe, and Bill Gates, President of Microsoft. A young actress in silver makeup 
portrayed the Internet (“Pseudonymes: Net, Réseau…”). ISOC organized the defendant’s 
crimes under four main themes: disrupting time and space; assaulting the notion of 
individual liberty; accelerating social fracturing; and propagating the diffusion of illicit 
content.76  
The mock trial—dubbed “Procès de l'Internet: parole à la défense!”—constituted 
the main attraction at the 1998 Fête de l’Internet. During this national festival, cities and 
towns throughout France hosted 750 events promoting public deliberation on the 
Internet.77 Originally conceived by a small cadre of intellectuels engagés and civil society 
organizations, and motivated in part by French politicians’ growing concern over the 
nation’s slow Internet adoption relative to its Western counterparts, the Fête has since 
become a fixture of French civic culture. It is now an annual event. Each year, the Fête 
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features a different theme, garnering hundreds of civil society, governmental, and 
celebrity sponsors, as well as significant national media attention.  
Scholars studying the Fête de l’Internet have highlighted the event’s political 
character.78  Scholars studying the right to be forgotten, however, have thus far shied 
away from political explanations for France’s support of the right, instead focusing on 
excavating the jurisprudential roots of the right. This chapter suggests that national 
politics is a neglected explanatory factor for French support of the right to be forgotten. 
Through its 1998 tongue-in-cheek mock trial of the Internet, as well as its present support 
for an extraterritorial right to be forgotten, France conveys a political message to its 
European counterparts and the United States: France is ready and willing to lead the 
Western resistance against American digital hegemony.   
I develop my argument by chronologically tracing what I identify as the two main 
developments in French cybergovernance policy: the conception of the télématique and 
the modèle républicain cybergovernance paradigms. Each development consists of a 
theorization stage and an implementation stage. The theorization stage for the former 
occurs in the mid-1970s, when the Nora-Minc report on the “information society” deems 
American domination of the cybersphere an existential threat to the French nation. The 
report theorizes a novel cybergovernance paradigm—le télématique—as a means for 
countering the threat. From the late 1970s through the 1980s, the French government 
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dutifully realizes le télématique by developing and diffusing Minitel, a statist telematics 
network.  
The theorization stage for the latter paradigm occurs in the early 1990s. After the 
diffusion of the American-developed Internet and the fall of Minitel, France once again 
falls behind in cyberspace, prompting politician Patrick Bloche to propose a shift from le 
télématique to an alternative cybergovernance paradigm: le modèle républicain. France is 
currently at work implementing this cybergovernance paradigm. The proposal of the 
“Digital Republic” Bill, and France’s enthusiastic endorsement of an extraterritorial right 
to be forgotten, constitute France’s attempt to construct and promote a French 
republican alternative to the American model of cybergovernance.  
3.1 A QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL DOCUMENTS  
 
The analyses in this chapter are drawn from a set of organizational and institutional 
documents, legislative bills, transcripts of legislative debates, and public statements on 
cyberpolicy from the 1970s onward. In particular, I focus my analysis on three seminal 
documents, each related to an important moment in the history of French cyberpolicy:  
 The 1978 Nora-Minc Report; 
 Patrick Bloche’s 1999 memo to the Prime Minister of France, Le Désir de 
France: la présence internationale de la France et de la francophonie dans la 
société de l'information; 
 The 2016 Digital Republic Bill, and the legislative discourse preceding 
official enactment of the bill.  
 
To construct this chapter’s argument, I employ a method commonly applied in cultural 
studies and political science research: qualitative document analysis. Qualitative 
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document analysis “yields data—excerpts, quotations, or entire passages—that the 
research then organizes “into major themes, categories, and case examples.”79 The 
primary advantage of qualitative document analysis is that the iterative process allows for 
thematic analysis, and thus, for “thick description” of empirical phenomena, thereby 
yielding more comprehensive conclusion than would quantitative analysis.   
The most common criticisms levied against this approach involve its objectivity 
and its generalizability. The early phase of research emphasizes data selection rather than 
data collection, inspiring concerns about the objectivity of the researcher. The final phase 
of research lacks an objective test of statistical significance, inspiring concerns about the 
generalizability of the findings. It is therefore unclear exactly how readers should assess 
conclusions drawn from a qualitative data analysis.80  
To address this legitimate concern, this chapter follows the standards set forth by 
Wesley (2014) for the systematic qualitative analysis of political documents. As Wesley 
states, “The results of a QDA study are confirmable if the inferences drawn are traceable 
to data contained in the documents, themselves, and if the preponderance of evidence 
corroborates those findings. This is the very essence of empirical inquiry.”81  
In order to empirically assess the results of a QDA study, the researcher and the 
reader must distribute the burden of proof as follows. First, the qualitative researcher 
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must triangulate documentary evidence by integrating analyses of official policy memos 
with discourse on the production and reception of those memos—legislative debate 
transcripts, for example. Second, she must highlight discrepant evidence and weigh 
alternative hypotheses. If the qualitative analysis meets these standards, the reader may 
assess the results of the study by inquiring, “Would I have reached the same general 
conclusions, given the opportunity to read the same set of documents under similar 
conditions?”82 
Having outlined this chapter’s structure and methodology, I will now introduce 
France’s first foray into cybergovernance policy: the curious case of a best-selling 
administrative report.    
3.2 LE TÉLÉMATIQUE 
 
3.2.1 Theorizing Le Télématique 
In 1976, the President of the Republic, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, appointed Simon Nora to 
head a newly established commission on the “information society.” The commission was 
established to address increasing anxiety regarding American domination of cyberspace 
and France’s waning influence.  The commission aimed to: “faire progresser la réflexion 
sur les moyens de conduire l'informatisation de la société, et, d'autre part, à déterminer 
avec plus de précision le champ de l'étude et la nature du mandat à confier à une 
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éventuelle commission.”83 Two years later, the commission produced its chief deliverable: 
a 162-page report titled, “L'informatisation de la société: rapport à M. le Président de la 
République,” more commonly referred to as the Nora-Minc report.   
The Nora-Minc report deems American domination of the cybersphere an 
existential threat to the French nation. It begins with an ominous premonition: “Si la 
France ne trouve pas de réponse correcte à des défis grave et neufs, ses tensions 
intérieures lui ôteront la capacité de maîtriser son destin.”84 The commission later 
clarifies the primary “défi grave” facing France in the information society: 
Dans l'état actuel des implantations et des stratégies des sociétés 
informatiques, il est probable que les transferts vers les Etats-Unis resteront 
privilégiés. Ceci risque de créer une dépendance des utilisateurs européens 
à l'égard de leurs fournisseurs américains.85 
 
Here, the Nora-Minc commission highlights the danger of increasing European 
dependence on American technology companies. The report quickly narrows its focus to 
France’s dependence on the American computer industry in particular, citing the fact that 
IBM, an American company, provides 20% of office terminals in France. American 
domination of the computer industry poses “des risques affectant l’équilibre économique, 
le “consensus social,” et l’indépendance nationale.”86 In other words, the dangers posed 
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by American domination are all encompassing for the country and its people: they 
threaten the economic, social, and political fabric of the French nation.   
The Nora-Minc report then declares that non-French national efforts to address 
the threat of American digital hegemony have been insufficient thus far. The report 
acknowledges that France is not alone in its concern over American hegemony in the 
cybersphere. On the contrary, several countries have deployed unique cybergovernance 
strategies in response to American domination of the computer industry. Japan, for 
example, adopted a protectionist attitude and worked to develop its technological 
information industry. The Germans, in contrast, acquiesced to American domination of 
the cybersphere, focusing instead on building an expertise in nuclear technology. 
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom attempted to remain competitive by diversifying its 
technological and communications sector.87 The Nora-Minc report recognizes these 
efforts, but emphasizes its conclusion that the United States still dominates the computer 
industry in each of these countries.  
Given these findings, the Nora-Minc commission proposes that France exceed the 
efforts of any other country in the quest to counter the threat of American cyber-
domination. The report theorizes a novel cybergovernance paradigm—le télématique—
considered by its authors as uniquely capable of enabling France to counter American 
digital hegemony:  
Cette imbrication croissante des ordinateurs et des télécommunications que 
nous appellerons “la télématique » ouvre un horizon radicalement neuf. Ce 
n'est certes pas d'hier que les moyens de communications structurent les 
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communautés : routes, chemins de fer, électricité, autant d'étapes d'une 
organisation familiale, locale, nationale, multinationale.88 
 
Tellingly, however, the report never defines the term le télématique in its own right. 
Rather, it explains the concept by juxtaposing it as a rival to an American term, 
“compunication.” Couched in a footnote, the report offers the definition of le télématique 
as a “neologism” and “cousin” of “compunication.” The report distinguishes conceptually 
between le télématique and “compunication,” however, by arguing that the latter 
American term emphasizes informatics—mainly, the computer industry— while the 
former French term rests on telematics, the telecommunications industry.89 According to 
the Nora-Minc commission, France should resist American digital hegemony not by 
increasing its competitiveness on American’s own playing field of informatics, as other 
countries have done, but by building an alternate playing field altogether: a telematics 
network.  
The trajectory of the Nora-Minc report diverged sharply from that of other 
administrative reports, when in 1978, it became a bestseller. Initially, the report circulated 
among a select cadre of politicians and academics, but on May 19, 1978, La 
Documentation Française presented it to the press.90 Gripped by its sheer rhetorical flair, 
topicality, and bold pronouncements regarding France’s digital future, several publishing 
houses immediately began competing for exclusive rights to publication. Eventually, Le 
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Seuil won the contract for making the report available to the public and sold three 
separate editions within a year.91 Over the course of a decade, the French public 
purchased 125,000 copies of the Nora-Minc report—an exceptional number for an 
administrative report—cementing the report’s status as a best seller.92 Following the 
report’s initial success, eight countries—Italy, Hungary, the United States, Japan, Brazil, 
Portugal, and Mexico—obtained the right to publish foreign translations of the report.93   
Western academics—Americans, in particular—presented the report as an 
exquisite snapshot of public opinion in France regarding the information society. In his 
introduction of the English translation of the Nora-Minc report, “The Computerization of 
Society,” sociologist Daniel Bell christened it “a mirror of French society.” Similarly, the 
May 1981 issue of the Sociological Review, described it as “typically French: elegant, 
enigmatic, remarkably philosophical, magisterial and just occasionally absurd.”94 
American commentators oversimplified the matter, implying that an administrative 
report, even one that enjoyed unusual popularity in French media, represented a 
monolithic French opinion on cyberpolicy. 
While the Nora-Minc report may not have comprehensively communicated French 
public opinion, political discourse on the report revealed that its message resonated with 
government representatives across the political spectrum. News channels broadcast 
several debates on the report. Channel Antenne 2 televised a particularly important 
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debate titled “L’ordinateur et notre avenir.” The debate featured Simon Nora himself, in 
addition to participants from a variety of political backgrounds: Alain Devaquet of the 
Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), Michel Pinton of the Union pour la Démocratie 
Française (UDF), Laurent Fabius of the Parti socialiste (PS), and Anicet Le Pors of the 
Parti communiste (PC). Curiously, neither center-left nor center-right politicians offered 
criticism of the report during the debate. The Nora-Minc report was sufficiently centrist, 
and information policy did not constitute a cardinal component of either party’s platform 
in the 1970s.95  
Criticism for the report came primarily from the far-left socialist and communist 
parties. Even these criticisms were limited in scope, however, as the far-left politicians 
were primarily concerned with advocating the inclusion of their pet issues. For example, 
leftist party leaders criticized the Nora-Minc report for the inadequate attention paid to 
employment issues in the information society.96 Later, environmentalist politicians 
formed a commission on “Ecologie et informatique.” The commission held public debates 
and published articles critiquing the Nora-Minc report’s negligence of potential 
environmental implications of the information society.97  
The Nora-Minc report constitutes the theoretical foundation of France’s nascent 
cyberpolicy. Because the report was so well received by the French public and the 
political class, it had enormous impact on the development of France’s cyberpolicy. The 
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negligible debate that the report engendered was superficial. No French politician 
publically questioned the report’s fundamental claims: first, that American digital 
hegemony poses an existential threat to the economic, social, and political fabric of the 
French nation, and second, that France must develop an alternate French model of 
cybergovernance to rival the domineering American computer industry.  
In the section that follows, I outline the implementation of le télematique, in which 
French policymakers attempt to address the central problems identified in the Nora-Minc 
report through the development and distribution of Minitel, a novel telematics network.  
3.2.2 Realizing Le Télématique  
 
Following the success of the Nora-Minc report, the French government dutifully heeded 
the commission’s primary suggestion, and set about strengthening and leveraging its 
telecommunications infrastructure. Within a year, the government asked the Directorate 
General of Telecommunications (DGT), the country’s national telecommunications 
department, to lead the effort.98 After releasing a research report outlining its approach, 
the DGT began to implement the plan télématique. According to the plan, France would 
adapt its existing telecommunications infrastructure to accommodate new services. The 
primary project was the creation of an electronic phone directory, called the annuaire 
électronique.  
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Early attempts to deploy the annuaire électronique inspired the development of a 
more ambitious project: an interactive, online public videotex system. The system was 
officially called l’Acquisition Numérique et Télévisualisation d’Images Organisées en Pages 
d’Ecriture (ANTIOPE), but more commonly referred to by its trade name, Minitel. The 
Minitel network proved extraordinarily successful within France. By 1990, it had reached 
a peak of 1.5 billion connections, and had facilitated 100 million hours of communication. 
Roughly a quarter to a third of French households—an estimated 14 million individual 
users—regularly connected to Minitel.99  
On its face, Minitel is indistinguishable from any other pre-World Wide Web 
online service, although it was particularly successful. The network provided its users 
with many of the same services that the Internet does now: an online phonebook (the 
much heralded annuaire électronique), information on weather and transportation 
schedules, banking and ordering services, and message boards.100 Users accessed these 
services through a personal terminal that looked much like the early computing machines 
made by IBM. 
However, to cast Minitel as a French proto-Internet obscures the politically 
charged nature of the technology. In the development stage, the French government took 
great pains to identify Minitel as a decidedly French technology. Even the adoption of the 
underlying transmission protocol—something that would ordinarily constitute a highly 
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technical determination—was politically motivated. France decided to adopt a packet-
switching technology called X.25 rather than Transfer Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) precisely because TCP/IP was undergirded ARPA-NET, an early American proto-
Internet network.101  
Nearly every subsequent design decision involving the Minitel network adhered to 
a calculated political logic. The primary aim was to position Minitel as a bulwark against 
American domination of the computer industry. To achieve this aim, France Telecom, 
France’s public telecommunications company managed the entire Minitel network, while 
the French government subsidized personal household terminals. Minitel terminals 
connected to external networks and databases through dial-up landline telephone 
networks. This design choice meant that the only manner in which one could use Minitel 
was to go through the French national telecommunications infrastructure. Access to the 
network necessarily excluded those who did not subscribe to France Telecom subscribers, 
i.e. individuals outside of France. 102  
The rhetoric surrounding the development and marketing of Minitel further 
reveals the extent of French angst concerning American domination of cyber space. On 
March 10, 1997, France’s President, Jacques Chirac, proudly declared the following during 
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an interview on France 2: “La boulangère d’Aubervilliers sait parfaitement interroger sa 
banque par Minitel, alors que la boulangère de New York en est incapable.”103 In the 
“Authorized Biography of Minitel,” chief Minitel publicist Marie Marchand commented 
on the deployment of the electronic directory:  
There we go again: ‘a world’s first.’ France was back at it, showing that it 
could outdo the rest of the world; that come hell or high water it could 
come up with the boldest technological strategy, that France could go it 
alone, with no international help… Once the electronic directory was 
extended throughout France... The American press devoted considerable 
space to this French success story.”104 
 
Even at the height of its domestic success, French politicians and policymakers alike went 
out of their way to define Minitel not on its own terms, but in contrast to American 
corporate dominance. The development and diffusion of Minitel, represented a 
methodical effort on behalf of the French government thus to transform the le 
télématique, derived from the Nora-Minc report, from abstract cyber theory to actionable 
cybergovernance policy. Minitel, in essence, is an embodiment of France’s rejection of 
American digital hegemony and its quest for French exceptionalism in the cybersphere.105 
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3.3 LE MODELE REPUBLICAIN  
 
3.3.1 Theorizing Le Modèle Républicain 
Heartened by the domestic success of the Minitel network, French policymakers 
considered exporting the technology abroad. By the mid-1990s, the French government 
and France Telecom began laying the groundwork to set up telematics networks in other 
European countries, and even as far away as Brazil.106  
But in 1991, the United States finally went public with the Internet. France’s 
implementation of the plan télématique came to a screeching halt. The Internet was a 
better product than Minitel—it resolved many of Minitel’s technical limitations, such as 
low quality graphics, and it possessed superior data transmission protocols. Minitel was “a 
supply-led, top-down-imposed technology which took little account of social demand,” 
while the Internet was decentralized. The Internet was thus better equipped to respond 
to consumer demand and penetrate foreign markets.107 Unsurprisingly, the American-
developed Internet became a global phenomenon, while the French-developed Minitel 
suffocated slowly within France’s borders.  
Initially, French government officials and academics expressed open hostility to 
the Internet.108 The Nora-Minc report framed the Internet as an existential threat to the 
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political, economic, and social fabric of the French nation, an idea that still resonated 
with the political elite. Furthermore, the French government, via France Telecom, had 
invested enormous sums of money and vast public resources in the development and 
deployment of Minitel. They were, therefore, reluctant to abandon the telematics 
network.  
In the early 1990s, a government memo marked a turning point in French 
cyberpolicy. In the memo, which was drafted for the president, politician Patrick Bloche 
boldly encouraged France to embrace the Internet, albeit with a decidedly French twist. 
Bloche’s memo, entitled “Le Désir de France : la présence internationale de la France et de 
la francophonie dans la société de l'information,” constituted the first major revision of 
France’s information policy since the Nora-Minc report. Much like the Nora-Minc report, 
“Le désir the France” expressed concern over American digital hegemony from the outset. 
However, Bloche declares:  
La France, si elle le veut, a toutes ses chances. Il ne s’agit pas de ‘courir’ 
après les Américains, de mesurer jour après jour le pourcentage des 
contenus en français sur le Web, mais bien de mesurer l’intérêt d’un outil 
nouveau, profondément innovant, que nous pouvons faire nôtre en 
inventant nos propres usages.109 
 
Here, Bloche encourages France to make Internet policy a political priority. But Bloche 
considers French embrace of the Internet not as an acknowledgement of American 
cultural hegemony, but rather, as an opportunity for France. He states : “Il ne suffit pas 
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d’être présent, encore faut-il avoir quelque chose à dire. La France peut essayer de 
proposer le modèle d’une société de l’information républicaine.” 110 Bloche suggests that, 
rather than impose its outdated concept of le télématique on the rest of the world, France 
should use the phenomenon of the global Internet to develop a republican model of the 
information society.  
 Not only would this republican model stand up to American cultural hegemony 
and preserve the French cultural exception even as the Internet disseminated across the 
globe, but it would serve France’s geopolitical objectives. Bloche writes, “Pour la première 
fois, le concept de francophonie peut prendre une réalité grâce aux outils virtuels.”111 
Bloche sees the emerging diffusion of information technology as an opportunity to finally 
define “la francophonie,” and subsequently to reach “pockets” of la francophonie that were 
previously inaccessible.   
 Bloche also asserted the relevance of the French jurisprudential model to the 
European debate on cybergovernance policy. According to Bloche,  
La France doit trouver dans la diffusion de son droit sur l'internet un moyen 
de renforcer sa présence internationale et son influence. En effet, la 
notoriété de nos facultés et de certains de nos spécialistes donne à notre 
pays une réputation juridique. La France a également beaucoup exporté son 
droit, en premier lieu vers ses anciennes colonies, mais on connaît 
également le rayonnement international qu'a connu notre code civil… À 
l'heure de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne, le droit français peut 
également constituer une source d'inspiration pour les futurs États 
membres.112  
 
                                                     
110 Bloche, “Le Désir de France,” 8. “Merely being present does not suffice; we must have something to say. 
France should attempt to propose a republican model of the information society.”   
111 Bloche, “Le Désir de France,” 14. “For the first time, the concept of ‘la francophonie’ can become a reality, 
thanks to virtual tools.”  
112 Bloche, “Le Désir de France,” 61.  
 66 
Here, Bloche evokes the French exception. He writes that France’s renowned legal 
academic institutions and specialists, as well as its famed civil code, have imparted upon 
the nation a reputation as a legal powerhouse. Bloche implies that France has a duty to 
export its legal tradition to other countries, as it did to its former colonies. Then, the 
political ambition to nurture the French exception resurfaces, as Bloche implores France 
to take the lead among its fellow European countries on crafting cybergovernance policy 
in order to reinforce its international presence and influence.  
 Bloche’s memo introduced the conception of France as a republican model for the 
information society to official French cyberpolicy. This idea was reinforced by French 
citizens, politicians, and intellectuels engagés alike. In 1997, Jacques Attali, a prominent 
French social theorist and political advisor, published an editorial in Le Monde on the 
future of France’s Internet policy. The editorial was perhaps the most explicit 
reinforcement of Bloche’s recommendations. Tellingly, the article was titled “Le septième 
continent” (The Seventh Continent).  
Attali explained that scholars and policymakers had analogized the Internet to a 
network, when it really was more like a continent—the seventh continent, to be precise.113 
He continued:  
L’Internet devient donc aujourd’hui, dans l’imaginaire du monde, ce 
qu’était l’Amérique en 1492 pour les Européens : un lieu indemne de nos 
carences, un espace libre de nos héritages, un paradis du libre-échange, où 
on pourra enfin construire un homme neuf, propre, débarrassé de ce qui le 
salit et le limite, un consommateur insomniaque et un travailleur 
infatigable.114  
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This article demonstrates the late 20th century French conception of the Internet as a 
continent ripe for colonization. Attali goes so far as to make the analogy that the Internet 
is to Europe now what America was to Europe in 1492. Bloche’s argument illustrates the 
development of the notion that the Internet is a tool for France to perform its cultural 
exceptionalism and to exhibit its republican model of governance, vis-à-vis American 
cultural and political domination.   
3.3.2 Realizing Le Modèle Républicain  
France transformed Bloche’s theoretical cyber paradigm into policy with the introduction 
of the omnibus Digital Republic Bill, as well as with the national endorsement of the 
extraterritorial right to be forgotten. I argue that the implementation of Bloche’s 
cybergovernance paradigm, while it constitutes a shift from le télématique of the 1970s 
and 1980s, is ultimately a manifestation of the continuity in France’s core objectives: 
rejection of American digital hegemony and the establishment of French exceptionalism 
in the cybersphere.  
3.3.2.1 The Digital Republic Bill  
 
After years of public forums and an online consultation, the French National Assembly 
passed the comprehensive “Digital Republic” bill on January 26, 2016. The bill is 
uncharacteristically comprehensive for a data protection bill, proposing not only a set of 
regulations on the digital sphere, but also declaring a set of digital rights for data subjects. 
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The current version of the proposal advises amending Article 32 of the French Data 
Protection Act to require data controllers to inform their data subjects of the retention 
period that applies to their data. Another provision aims to allow data subjects to provide 
instructions to a data controller regarding the erasure or communication of their personal 
data after death.115        
In public communications about the Digital Republic Bill, the French government 
directly identifies the bill’s primary function as political. The official government website 
expressly ties the Internet to French republican tenets: “As Internet access for all 
epitomises the Republican notions of solidarity and the inclusion of citizens, it will be one 
of the mainstays of the Digital Republic bill.”116 Furthermore, the fact that the bill was 
open-source and open for public comment during the draft period emphasized the 
commitment to a republican model of the Internet, built on social cohesion and 
solidarity. At a press conference promoting the launch of the open forum, Prime Minister 
Valls characterized the initiative as “the first time in France, or indeed in any European 
country, that a proposed law has been opened to citizens in this way.”117 When considered 
in isolation, French policymakers’ celebration of the bill as a model for other Western 
countries—particularly in Europe—does not seem particularly noteworthy. However, 
when considered within the cultural and historical context of French cybergovernance 
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policy, it becomes evident that France’s Digital Republic Bill represents a continuation of 
French cybergovernance policy, as was most recently articulated in Bloche’s 1999 memo.  
During the legislative debate on the Digital Republic Bill, policymakers devoted 
significant time to the title of the bill itself. Axelle Lemaire, a Secretary of State in the 
French government and the minister responsible for Digital Affairs in the French Finance 
Ministry, begins her case for the bill by speaking to the essence of the “Digital Republic:” 
“Ce texte parle de liberté, de fraternité et d’égalité: liberté d’accès au savoir et aux 
données, accès égal au réseau, solidarité entre les territoires.”118 Her introduction was not 
just rhetorical flair; the legislative transcript shows that the national assembly senators 
immediately seized on the concept of the “Digital Republic,” as both the title of the bill, 
and as an actionable goal in and of itself. First, Bernard Gerard from the UPM responds:  
Madame la secrétaire d’État, je ne suis pas entièrement convaincu par le 
titre du projet de loi, mais là n’est pas l’essentiel. Disons que je prends la 
République numérique comme un immense défi. C’est un défi qui concerne 
notre société, mais aussi l’Europe et le monde : il n’a pas de frontières.119 
 
Then, Delphine Batho from the Socialist Party interjects: “J’approuve le choix de son titre ; 
je souhaite même que l’on aille jusqu’au bout de la logique qui y préside. Le projet, en 
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effet, ne répond pas entièrement à cette question fondamentale : comment la 
souveraineté s’exerce-t-elle dans le cyberespace ?”120  
I highlight this line of questioning because it is unusual in legislative debate. 
Normally, French policymakers in the National Assembly would be first and foremost 
concerned with the “nitty-gritty” of the law—how exactly does it intend to carry out its 
provisions? But in the legislative discourse over the Digital Republic Bill, we see a 
legislative debate not on specific policy questions, but rather on fundamental questions of 
Republican philosophy. We see many of France’s inquietudes about the cybersphere, as 
previously outlined in this chapter, articulated by French policymakers: Does the Internet 
have borders? Can we really transpose France’s republican model and frontiers onto 
cyberspace? 
The second legislative debate on the bill took place in the Senate, Jean-Claude 
Requier, a PRG party member, notes the following:  
Le monopole historique des institutions américaines qui entretiennent et 
gouvernent actuellement l’architecture technique du réseau ou encore 
l’attribution et l’archivage des noms de domaines doit être également remis 
en cause. Dans cette logique, la détermination d’un modèle alternatif est un 
préalable nécessaire à ces négociations.121 
 
                                                     
120 Ibid. “I approve of the choice for the title; I would also like to discuss its relation to the end goal of the 
project. This project, in essence, does not fully address a fundamental question: how does sovereignty 
manifest in cyberspace?”  
121 “Séance du 28 septembre 2016 (compte rendu intégral des débats),” April 14, 2017, 
https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201609/s20160928/s20160928002.html#int2. “The historic monopoly of 
American institutions that currently maintain and govern the technical architecture of information 
networks must also be challenged. It follows that the determination of an alternate model [of 
cybergovernance] is critical during this discourse.”  
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Here, Requier explicitly mentions the need for France to pose an alternative to the 
American model that has dominated the cybersphere. Furthermore, he notes that the 
Digital Republic Bill fulfills that need. This commentary further confirms the ideological 
continuity in France’s policy towards the cyberspace; the Digital Republic Bill is France’s 
ultimate realization of Bloche’s proposals articulated in “Le désir de France.”  
3.3.2.2 The Extraterritorial Right to Be Forgotten  
France’s fervent endorsement of an extraterritorial right to be forgotten, like the Digital 
Republic Bill, is a manifestation of France’s desire to construct a particularly French-
republican model for cybergovernance. To support this claim, I offer analyses from two 
primary sources.  
First, I examine the Charte du droit à l’oubli dans les sites collaboratifs et les 
moteurs de recherche. Initially launched in November 2009 by France’s Secretary of State, 
Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, the project spawned two charters, each of which was 
voluntarily signed by representatives from several media companies and search engines. 
The project aimed to establish a national norm among the signatories regarding respect 
for the right to be forgotten in France. The document is revelatory not as much in its 
content as in its gaps. French companies, E-Enfance, Action Innocence, and CNAFC, 
dominate the list of signatories. The only American-based signatory is Microsoft France, 
which likely signed on to leverage its position as competitor to Google in the European 
market. The two American technology giants most affected by and expected to comply 
with the European right to be forgotten—Google and Facebook—are notably absent from 
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the list of signatories.122 When situated in the historical and political context of French 
cyberpolicy development, the charter assumes a uniquely political and strategic meaning; 
it is a symbol of French corporate solidarity against American hegemony in cyberspace. 
Second, I analyze an op-ed written by CNIL President, Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, 
and published by Le Monde on December 29, 2016. In the article, Falque-Pierrotin 
describes the refusal of American companies—namely, Wikipedia and Google—to 
recognize an extraterritorial version of the right to be forgotten. Falque-Pierrotin declares 
the following:  
C’est une question basique de souveraineté, c’est-à-dire d’effectivité de la 
protection des droits. Ce droit au déréférencement n’est d’ailleurs ouvert 
qu’au bénéfice des seuls résidents européens ; il ne concerne pas un Chinois 
en Chine ou un Américain au Nevada.123 
 
Here, Falque-Pierrotin frames France’s push for a global right to delisting not as a 
question of extraterritoriality, but rather, of national sovereignty. She continues to 
emphasize the importance of safeguarding national sovereignty in the 
cybersphere, and reiterates the idea that France, and Europe more broadly, can 
serve as models for the rest of the world in this respect. In doing so, Falque-
Pierrotin echoes Bloche’s 1999 call for France to serve as a jurisprudential model 
for Europe and the broader international community as it attempts to safeguard its 
                                                     
122 Laurent Checola, "’Droit à l'oubli’ sur Internet : une charte signée sans Google ni Facebook,” Le Monde, 
October 13, 2010,  http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2010/10/13/droit-a-l-oubli-sur-internet-une-
charte-signee-sans-google-ni-facebook_1425667_651865.html.  
123 Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, “Pour un droit au déréférencement mondial,” Le Monde, December 29, 2016, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/12/29/isabelle-falque-pierrotin-pour-un-droit-au-
dereferencement-mondial_5055111_3232.html. “This constitutes a basic question of sovereignty; in other 
words, the efficient protection of rights. This right to delisting as currently conceived benefits solely 
European residents; it does not apply to a Chinese person in China or an American in Nevada.”   
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sovereignty from encroaching American digital hegemony.124 CNIL’s call for an 
extraterritorial right to be forgotten thus constitutes a political realization of le 
modèle républicain that was first conceived in Bloche’s memo.  
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout these developments in cybergovernance policy, France’s fundamental 
mission in cyberspace remains strikingly stable and transparent. From the 1970s to the 
present day, France has nurtured twin cyberpolicy ambitions: to resist American digital 
hegemony, and to fortify the French exception in cyberspace. The passage of the Digital 
Republic Bill, along with France’s advocacy for the extraterritorial right to be forgotten, 
represent France’s explicit attempt to construct and realize the republican model of the 
information society that Bloche and other public intellectuals first proposed in the 1990s. 
Together, these political actions represent, at least in part, France’s “last stand” against 
U.S. digital hegemony. They also comprise France’s most recent and most explicit attempt 
to demonstrate its exceptionalist technology policy in the cybersphere.  
 
 
  
                                                     
124 Ibid.  
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 CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis began by highlighting a curious peculiarity regarding France’s engagement 
with the European right to be forgotten. While the establishment of the right to be 
forgotten ignited a debate among Western privacy scholars and policymakers hailing 
from both sides of the Atlantic, no country has participated in the debate with as much 
fervor as has France. What explains France’s unique sense of urgency with regards to the 
digital right to be forgotten?   
Because the right to be forgotten is first and foremost a legal issue, legal scholars have 
played a fundamental role in framing this debate. They have emphasized French 
jurisprudential roots of the right to be forgotten, identifying the droit à l’oubli as its 
intellectual antecedent. In Chapter One, I interrogate this lineage, eventually arguing that 
French jurisprudence on both le droit à l’oubli and the right to be forgotten are too 
inconsistent and fragmented to constitute a sufficient explanation for ardent French 
support of the right to be forgotten. I conclude that other factors must contribute to this 
particular phenomenon.  
 Adopting a cultural studies approach, I consider cultural and political explanatory 
factors. In Chapter Two, I identify the isochronal dynamic between French society and 
the state, in which citizens cede individual liberties in exchange for state protection of 
their honor and reputation. I illustrate this dynamic through a series of examples from 
the 17th through 19th centuries, chosen to illustrate interactions between French society 
and the state regarding information privacy. I conclude that the high importance France 
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has historically placed on honor and reputation, along with the willingness of French 
citizens to cede individual liberties in exchange for state protection of personal 
information, helps explain France’s current attitude toward digital privacy, and the right 
to be forgotten, more specifically. 
In Chapter Three, I consider political factors motivating and facilitating France’s 
attitude toward the right to be forgotten. I identify the theorization and realization of two 
distinct cyber paradigms. I argue that despite a shift in political approach, France has 
maintained two core objectives: first, rejection of American digital hegemony, and 
second, a demonstration of French exceptionalism in the cybersphere. France’s support 
for an extraterritorial right to be forgotten represents the most recent iteration of France’s 
political pursuit of these goals.  
In sum, I reject the assertion that France’s ardent support of the right to be forgotten 
can be explained exclusively by jurisprudential history. I argue instead that a coalescence 
of legal, cultural, and political factors have motivated and sustained France’s peculiar 
attitude towards cyberpolicy. In doing this, I demonstrate that the literature on the right 
to be forgotten dramatically oversimplifies, and sometimes mistakenly identifies, the 
roots of the French attitude toward the right to be forgotten. I complicate the narrative 
and identify the ways in which cultural, political, and legal factors determine the French 
attitude toward digital privacy. 
This research should prompt further inquiry—qualitative, as well as quantitative in 
nature—into American, European, and Asian attitudes towards digital information policy, 
and the right to be forgotten, in particular. It is likely that jurisprudential, cultural, and 
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political differences will persist. This inquiry, however, will help identify the foundations 
and characteristics of national and regional attitudes towards cybergovernance, and will 
thus facilitate transatlantic cooperation on the development of necessary and 
proportionate digital privacy standards.  
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